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RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0069  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0230  
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0025

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STATE FOR PM/ISN - MFELIPE

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [PREL](#) [SY](#) [CA](#)  
SUBJECT: PSI: CANADIAN FOLLOW-UP ON ATTEMPT TO SHIP  
U.S.-ORIGIN TEST EQUIPMENT TO SYRIA VIA THE UAE

REF: A. STATE 13872

- [1](#)B. ABU DHABI 168
- [1](#)C. OTTAWA 220

[1](#)1. Action request: See para 3.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Responding to refs A and C, on February 9 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Export Controls Division Deputy Director Steven Goodinson conveyed to us the points below regarding the attempted shipment of U.S.-origin test equipment to Syria by Polytech for International Supplies and Consultation (PISC):

-- We have determined that neither the exporter, Polytech for International Supplies and Consultation (PISC), nor the agent, Integral Transportation Networks Inc., have individual export permits for the goods in question. The firms applied jointly in the past for the export of US-origin goods (a commercial vehicle) to Syria but withdrew the application once they were informed that US re-export authorization was necessary for such a transaction.

-- Based on the information available to us, we have assessed the control status of the products exported by PISC to UAB. One of the product types exported, the vibration system (model BRVD-24) may be controlled by Canada's Export Control List under Items 6-15.B (MTCR) and 4-1.B (NSG) if the units are equipped with the 109 option, which is available for this model, and the unit is therefore capable of imparting forces greater than 50 kN measured bare table. However, the information available to us does not allow us to determine if this type of product was shipped.

-- If not otherwise controlled, this product would be controlled by Canada's Export Control List under Item 5400 as a good of US origin. For an export of Item 5400 goods (not otherwise included in the Export Control List), the exporter could declare General Export Permit #12 to ship this product to the UAE but not to Syria. Export of this product to Syria would require an individual export permit.

-- The other product type, the environmental humidity chamber (model TR20RC-3), is controlled under Item 5400 of the Export Control List. The exporter could declare General Export Permit #12 to ship this product to the UAE but not to Syria. Export of this product to Syria would require an individual export permit.

-- We have reviewed the documents provided to us and have concluded that there is some evidence that the goods were exported to the UAE from Canada with the intent to divert to Syria, in violation of the Export and Import Permits Act. We

have therefore referred this matter to the Investigations Branch of the Canada Border Services Agency for further action.

-- We have also been informed that US officials have solicited the assistance of UAE authorities to interdict the shipment in question and return it to the United States. We have instructed the Embassy of Canada to the UAE to contact appropriate UAE customs authorities to confirm our support for such action, and to offer any other assistance which may be appropriate.

-- We would be grateful if you would keep us fully informed as this matter proceeds in order to support our own investigation into the Canadian parties to this transaction.

¶3. (SBU) After delivering the points, Goodinson asked that we advise his office soonest whether the items in the second bullet point were shipped with the "109 option."

¶4. (SBU) Goodinson said Hamsho International (HI) was one of over 80 companies that shared the same address as PISC, and over 80 companies that shared the same address as PISC, and added that the Syrian Embassy in Ottawa's website identified HI Managing Director Ahmad Hamsho as a member of the Syrian Parliament and an "associate" of the Syrian Embassy. Goodinson then noted that the Canadian Embassy to the UAE would soon receive an instruction to intensify its non-proliferation and related law enforcement outreach to UAE authorities, and to deepen cooperation with allies and other like-minded nations there.

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WILKINS